

III. SEXUAL DEMONIZATION AS SEXUAL ALIENATION

III.0 Goals and themes of this chapter

Do not expect a lurid examination of sexuality depravity. Expect a philosophical critique of fear of sexuality provoked, perhaps, by sexual depravity.

One goal is to locate human sexuality within human rationality after admitting that human sexuality is almost the paradigm of human irrationality. The other goal is to complete my argument that our sexuality is inalienable from our humanity. I now argue that our sexuality is not so dangerous, degrading and irrational that we are entitled to reject it as characterizing what it is to be human. Attainment of the first goal provides a foundation for the moral theory I use as well as a major step towards the second goal. If sexuality is in our rationality, then not only is sexuality inseparable from what we are but also reason gives a morally right way for our sexuality to be just as reason gives a morally right way for our rationality to be. The second goal is crucial for my thesis that trying to develop morally correct character gives significance or meaning to human life. With sexuality as inalienable from being human, trying to develop morally correct character as the meaning of life requires trying to develop a morally correct sexual character as an inseparable component of a meaningful life.

A sub-theme, subtle but important, is suggesting and rejecting temptations to demonize rationality. The suggestions are reminders about the similarities between and interconnection of reasoning and sexuality. Under an assumption that we will not demonize and alienate our reason this comparison supports not demonizing our sexuality.

III.1 Humanizing vs. Demonizing

Demonizing sexuality is reacting to sexuality as primarily a destructive force threatening all that is important for a truly human life and which must be repressed, although unfortunately,

the human reproductive process. Demonizers regard sexuality as morally neutral by holding that without consideration of non-sexual factors, sexuality has no morally right way to be.

Demonizing places sexuality beneath moral good and evil. Male sexuality certainly tempts us to demonize sexuality. Demonizers regard male organisms as a “safety valve” to relieve dangerous and almost overpowering urges surging up in males. Manipulating attainment of male organisms to minimize damage done by their pursuit is an important guideline for sexual demonizers.

Indeed, any manipulation which does not conflict with other rules for protection of persons and property is justified. A search for the right way for orgasms to be attained is irrelevant.

Demonizing attitudes are rationalized with theories about sexuality which entail its moral neutrality. These are theories reducing sexuality to processes which can be completely studied by the natural and social sciences. Demonizing theories not only regard sexuality as morally neutral for scientific study; they reduce it for the sake of specifying what it really is. Reducing sexuality to the factual represents it as morally neutral because we do not derive “ought” from “is,” i.e., facts alone do not impose obligations.

III.1.1 Physiological and psychological demonization

The two levels of demonizing reduction correspond to two levels of reduction to natural processes for scientific study. The first level reduces sexuality to the neurobiological processes of sexuality. On the first level if there is any mention of goals to be attained it is mention of physiological goals of one physiological process for the operation of another physiological process within the body. For instance, it might be said that there is an increased blood flow to erect the penis. The second level reduces sexuality to the neuropsychological processes of sexuality. On the second level, there is recognition of feelings and goals of the the organism with respect to its external environment. At this level we talk of such things as inclinations toward

another person and plans to mate with it. Being in love and even shame can be studied at this second level.

Important methodological rules of reduction guide treatment of moral judgments. First, at this level we do not make moral judgments. Second, any behavior which sounds like moral judging is not treated as having any moral validity; it is simply behavior such as expressing hunger. Outside of some special medical situations, I think identification of sexuality with purely natural or, in a broad sense, biological processes, is the second level of reduction to the neuropsychological. So when writing of reduction of sexuality to the biological, I shall be writing of this second level of reduction; not reduction to the totally physiological.

III.1.2 Humanizing the demon

Developing a picture that human sexuality is inalienable from humanity confronts demonization. Male sexuality is not some force apart from us which drives us to misbehave. That is like saying “The devil made me do it!” The power of our sexuality is our power and we use it well or poorly. Most often poorly? Much effort is needed to set aside alienation when the dark and dangerous exercises of human sexuality are emphasized. A first step is to remind ourselves that reduction of sexuality to biology is only for purposes of natural science. The reduction by itself does not show us what sexuality really is. Indeed, reduction is a method for abstracting from sexuality as we experience it so that we can get better theories of what there really is in the parts not removed by the abstraction.

] III.2 Turning to the dark side,

Sexuality is, to say the least, a mixed blessing. There are acts of love. There are rapes. There are births. There are abortions. Boys become husbands and fathers. Some young men must be kept in cages. Girls become wives and mothers. Girls become prostitutes and “sex toys.”

There are sex trips to South East Asia. There is human trafficking. The ambivalent list goes on and on. We need not turn only to the horrors of sexuality. There is sadness and grief. Popular song and fiction tell us of constant frustration; especially in courting and bonding. In confrontation with the events and news of a single day, proclamations by religious people that sexuality is a tremendous gift from God sound delusional. Secular talk of the joys of sex seem like self-deception. It seems far more plausible that human sexuality is the result of natural selection, mindless of the welfare or woe of any human individual. I do not explicitly pay any attention to the work of Freud. But his general outlook on sexuality was far more realistic than those who celebrate or trivialize it.

III.2.1 Temptation to demonization

Realistic recognition of the “dark side” of sexuality provokes anxiety that human sexuality is nothing but a demonic evolutionary process operating to continue our species with no regard for individual well being. As demonic, operations of human sexuality are amoral. However, there is a continual struggle to domesticate the beast. I assume as a cultural universal: Human sexuality is controlled with rules for its suppression. Experiencing sexuality as demonic needing the control of intelligence tempts us to alienate human sexuality from human intelligence.

As already noted, “demonic” does not have to be interpreted as labeling some evil dimension of sexuality. The temptation to demonize sexuality is different from a temptation to regard sexuality as morally wrong or evil. “Demonic” conveys a sense of power and amorality; not immorality. Nonetheless, “demonic” definitely does not connote goodness and benevolence. Many who regard sexuality as an amoral force, and even dangerous, still do not regard it as a malevolent force. Frequently, sexuality is labeled “animal.” Would not “animal” be a better label

than “demonic?” I argue below against classifying human sexuality as simply animal. Classing sexuality as animal misleads us to forget that we human beings are the animals under consideration. I use labels to catch attention but ultimately it is best to confront directly the idea behind the labels. This idea I am confronting is that by itself human sexuality is a morally indifferent powerful force.

III.2.2 Light from the dark side

Recognition of the dark side protects us from being carried away with romantic and some progressive trivializing attitudes that sexuality as we experience it is an unqualified good to which only the fear and ignorance of prudes and prigs keeps us from appreciating.

I write of recognizing the dark side of sexuality. I do not write of exploring the dark side of sexuality. There is no exploration of the minds of serial rapists, sadists, masochists etc. There is no need for me to tell of it. There is literature on sexual depravity. It is even discussed in mainstream magazines such as *Newsweek*. For instance back in April 23, 2012, when it still had a printed issue, *Newsweek* had an article on the masochistic novels and films which seem to interest some liberated women. These are fantasies of being overpowered and spanked. Mere mention of the extremely popular sadomasochistic novel *Fifty Shades of Grey*¹ reminds us of the widespread fascination with sexuality’s dark side. Fascination presupposes recognition. Can we avoid reading of the dark side of sexuality in the daily news and being faced with it in current fiction? Especially in fiction!

III.2.3 Fiction and truth about sex

Stieg Larsson’s moralizing tales of taking vengeance on sexual depravity with sexual depravity vividly confront us with sexual horrors. (In a *New York Review of Books* essay “The Moralists,”² Tim Parks locates the success of Larsson’s poorly written and plotted novels in a

taste for moralizing.) Larsson links the fictional accounts with actual events. For instance, the Parts of his *Girl with the Dragon Tattoo*³ are introduced with brief statements of sexual violence in the progressive nation of Sweden. Part 2 announces: “Forty six percent of women in Sweden have been subjected to violence by a man.” Part 3 tells us: “Thirteen percent of the women in Sweden have been subjected to aggravated sexual assault outside a sexual relationship.” Finally, Part 4 reminds us: “Ninety two percent of women in Sweden who have been subjected to sexual assault have not reported the most recent violent incident to the police.”

Current fiction, including that which aspires to form our literature, may give us the most realistic picture of the horrors of human sexuality. (I apologize to serious writers for omitting them from my short list. Still, I list three to hint at the level to which I am referring. Toni Morrison, Philip Roth, Jonathan Franzen.) Perhaps reminding us that sexuality is “not at all nice” is one of the most important truths taught by contemporary literature. Literature does not have to be “politically correct.”

III.2.4 Science, theoretical & practical reasoning, truth about sex

Instead of a great gift of God, “natural blessing” or natural disaster should we not regard our sexuality as a biological force against which we must occasionally struggle as well as use and enjoy? From a biological perspective sexuality is a tremendous power which is neither good nor evil. Biological sexuality is a complex battery of natural factors that lead human beings to seek to use the bodies of others to reduce special inner tensions. The behaviors produced by these natural factors sometimes results in conception and birth while nothing else, without sophisticated uses of human intelligence, results in conception and birth. It is not misleading to label human biological sexuality as the human reproduction system.

We should regard sexuality as a biological force if “regard” means “accept as an useful approach for the scientific study of nature.” Familiarity with the fascinating neurophysiology of sexuality, along with the psychological and sociological facts and theories, are helpful for dealing intelligently with the moral dimension of our sexuality. We are not concerned with rules for right and wrong in a scientific study of nature. Scientific studies are totally in the scope of theoretical reasoning although teleological concepts, such as function, are used in the theories. As biological, no end developed in sexuality or method of pursuing the end is good or evil. However, even if we view sexuality amorally for scientific purposes we can continue to use moral categories to evaluate sexuality when not pursuing scientific goals.

Theoretical reasoning, cited in the previous paragraph is contrasted with practical reasoning. Theoretical reasoning focuses on finding out what is the case. Its goal is to uncover the facts and the theories explaining the facts. Natural science is the paradigm of theoretical reasoning. Practical reasoning focuses on finding means for ends we seek as well as determining which ends to seek. Engineering and moral thinking are paradigms of practical reasoning. A distinction between theoretical and practical thinking can be made precise when we self consciously discipline our thinking so that we think only about getting information or only about seeking goals. In daily life it is difficult to distinguish whether we are reasoning theoretically, practically or using some mixture. For this work it is not important to have precise definitions by which we can always distinguish between theoretical and practical reasoning. What is important is to carefully monitor my reasoning so that I do not base a claim of what *ought* to be, which is a paradigm claim of practical reason, solely on a claim of what *is* the case, which is a paradigm of theoretical reasoning.

It does not hurt to repeat the obvious. Rejection of some categories for scientific purposes does not require rejection of those categories for all purposes. In particular with sexuality, we experience sexuality operating in us. We cannot always hold it at “arms length” for scientific examination. Sexuality as had by us does not stand in the same relationship to us as when we study it. So, it is not surprising that we have different categories for living with it than merely studying it. Mention of scientific categories is a reminder to note that I am using ‘evolution’ as it is used in popularizations of science. Nothing I write depends upon professional disputes about the operation of evolution.

As sexuality has evolved in us a control system by moral norms has evolved in it. So a way sexuality ought to be has evolved in our sexuality. What is a way sexuality ought to be? A way sexuality ought to be is a way our moral sexual thinking says it ought to be. This entails that our thinking about sexuality includes moral rules for inhibiting it. When a man entertains “horny” thoughts he is traveling in territory governed by moral rules. A goal of this book is to articulate one of these rules. The chapter on pragmatic defense provides hope that these rules correspond with the truth, i.e., the way things are apart from our thinking.

In daily life where we use the moral categories which have evolved in us we are inside our morality. We stand in an internal relation to morality. When we are inside morality, we have the obligation to make our sexuality be as it ought to be. The internal moral relation to sexuality is as intellectually respectable as the external scientific relation to sexuality.

It is worth emphasizing that I will not try to derive a sexual morality from the sociological fact that human sexuality is morally restricted. An articulated sexual morality is derived internally from the morality in sexuality as we live sexually.

III.2.5 The truth about sex and normativity

As I so often claim: Human sexuality is that vast complex of ways we court, mate and bond for, amongst other things, reproducing. Some is innate; much is learned. As just argued, human sexuality is more than a subject for physiology. At this stage of evolution, it is inseparable from social rules forbidding some expressions of it. Hence, a full scientific picture of human sexuality has to bring out the role of human capacity for normative communal control and moral psychological inhibition. But concern with our sexuality goes way beyond seeking a scientific understanding of it. We are driven by it. We have to confront it, control it or be overwhelmed by it. Sexuality is a pervasive feature of human life which unleashes violence and upsets, at times, almost all social orders. Consider a desperate effort to confront it with our capacity to control ourselves with rules or norms.

III.3 Controlling AIDS by negotiating with the demon

The main purpose of this section is to exhibit a principle for controlling male sexuality which I think takes the wrong approach. The wrong approach is confronting male sexuality from a position of weakness. The position of weakness is the assumption that a principle for controlling male sexuality which would demand that it be right, viz., the Paternal Principle, simply cannot control the demon. So we have to try weaker principles which allow the demon to be fairly well satisfied so that there is a better chance of restricting some of its worst ravages.

A social scientist, struggling to find solutions to the AIDs epidemic, reminds us vividly of the irrational demonic character of sexuality and the need for inhibition of male sexuality. Even when we think we have sufficient techniques for preventing undesired conceptions, sexually transmitted diseases disrupt our social orders. Sexuality just cannot be “nice.”

III.3.1 Epstein on AIDS in Uganda,

Helen Epstein, an AIDS researcher, who offers a far more modest proposal than mine expresses well the demonic or magical character of sexuality and the need for inhibition of male sexuality. She writes: ⁴

“Sexuality truly does belong to the world of magic and unreason. It is impossible to plan and control it totally. We were made that way. If sex were an entirely rational process, the species would probably have died out long ago. But the delirious, illogical nature of sex makes setting a realistic HIV prevention policy very difficult.”

Helen Epstein, *New York Review of Books*

Later I qualify Epstein’s use of “irrational” in this quotation.

Professor Epstein finds that the public health data from Uganda supports a so-called Zero Grazing health policy as most effective for lowering rates of AID infections. She is not insensitive to a longing in some people for an effective abstinence only policy. She is not carried away with policies implicitly encouraging sexual activity restrained only with condoms. She warns “Cheerful, sexy condom ads that fail to address the real dangers of AIDS may promote a fatal carelessness;” Epstein believes we need to bring in control by principles. What principles? She continues “ but an exclusive emphasis on abstinence until marriage may well lead to an even more dangerous hysterical recidivism.” There is no realistic hope of using high moral principles to control the “beast” of male sexuality to be as it ought to be. There might, though, be hope for controlling it with prudential principles for damage control.

III.3.2 Zero Grazing principle,

She proposes a Zero Grazing principle. “The genius of the Zero Grazing campaign was that it recognized both the universal power of sexuality and the specific sexual culture of this part

of Africa, and it gave people advice they could realistically follow⁵.” The modest *Zero Grazing* “*imperative* is addressed primarily to men. It commands⁶:

“Try to stick to one partner, but if you have to keep your long-term mistresses and concubines and extra wives, at least avoid short-term casual encounters with bar girls and prostitutes. Also, you mustn't casually seduce and exploit young women, who may be susceptible to your charms and wealth. “

Helen Epstein, *New York Review of Books*

The Zero Grazing principle is similar to the Paternal Principle by telling men the proper mating behavior. It is dissimilar in at least two ways. First, it is proposed as a prudential principle for public health rather than as a moral principle. Second, it demands far less of men than the Paternal Principle, presumably because of low expectations. We shall find occasions to compare these two principles.

III.3.3 Fear of magic and irrationality in sexuality

Epstein's research and proposal provides two reminders. First sexuality needs personal and social inhibition. The magical and irrational ways of being human requires inhibition by the rational ways of being human. To be more specific: The magical and irrational ways of being sexual require inhibition by rational ways of being sexual. A time comes when some sexual urges have to be denied and the denial is usually not easy. Individuals may deny themselves or their society will do it for them. Social intervention is even more unpleasant for all concerned. Secondly, we are reminded of a fear of sexuality. It is a powerful biological force of nature which works through humans. But humans cannot master it. We can only moderate the damage it does.

Of course, without sociological research I am not entitled to make pronouncements on what many people think; let alone everyone. So the attribution of a fear of sexuality as an amoral or demonic force to people is a construction of a type of attitude towards sexuality which I think is widespread and founds the alternative stances towards sexuality. But characterizing sexuality as simply animal is probably more common than characterizing it as demonic. “Animalizing” sexuality is compatible with occasional demonization of sexuality but basically it is regarding sexuality as an important biological force. I regard differences between demonization and “animalization” as primarily verbal.

How can regarding sexuality as a biological force lead to sexual alienation? Here we are considering far more than the scientific stance towards sexuality. Here the temptation is to regard sexuality as we experience it in ourselves as biological force. This is a temptation against which I have to struggle.

] III.4 Demonization and sexual alienation

Demonizers’ reductive outlook of viewing sexuality as solely biologically is sexual alienation. It is alienation for those who identify themselves as the one who thinks, chooses and acts with their thoughts, choices and acts which are good or evil, i.e., those who identify themselves as moral agents. Even people who claim that all moral principles are human conventions are moral agents, because by virtue of being in some group or groups they use the moral conventions of a group. Their moral relativism is only an interpretation of their morality. So reduction of sexuality to the biological is likely alienation for all people who use human intelligence. The reductive biological outlook pulls human intelligence out of sexuality leaving it purely instinctive and not a system which does anything wise or foolish, right or wrong.

III.4.1 Two self model of sexual alienation

Consider a model of how to regard ourselves if we accept some moral evaluation of our sexual conduct but regard sexuality itself as not subject to moral evaluation. Now if we regard our sexuality as an amoral natural force, we regard ourselves as having within ourselves something different from ourselves which in some way has taken partial possession of our humanity. At least it copies our humanity by proposing ends and means. Perhaps men could say that we regard ourselves as having a “satyr” living within our self. A partial model of what I am trying to describe is provided by erotic dreams. We distance the actor in erotic dreams from ourselves and accept no guilt for either our selves or the actor in the dream. The erotic dreamer is only a partial model because people who accept some moral evaluation typically accept some moral restrictions on sexual activity. So if their sexual self misbehaves they accept blame for not having properly controlled their sexual self. But they do not accept their misbehaving sexual self as their real self. I suggest that “alienation” is an apt label for this dualistic way of regarding ourselves.

III.4.2 Authentic overcoming alienation vs. happiness

By overcoming sexual alienation I do not mean accepting our sexuality in a way which makes us comfortable. Consider a middle aged widower, Carl, sixty-one, who now accepts and relishes a future of viewing legal pornography which helps him to delightful nightly masturbation. He no longer feels guilt or shame. He now has far more sexual satisfaction than while his wife was alive. He is a paradigm of a man who accepts his sexuality in the sense of feeling no guilt about how he attains sexual pleasure. Later in this chapter we find Carl having a change of heart.

Overcoming sexual alienation is accepting our sexuality as an aspect of the way we think and feel. That means accepting it with moral norms for its control along with all kinds of

temptations to violate the norms. Accepting our sexuality, then, is to accept tension and thoughts of moral imperatives on how to resolve the tensions. It is not a recipe for happiness. It is an enlistment for combat. On other occasions, I offer reminders that authentic acceptance of sexuality as part of ourselves is to accept as our own powerful desires for its pleasures and enjoyment of those pleasures viz., voluptuousness. Having a right way for our sexuality to be is compatible with seeking and enjoying sexual activity. Of course, many people who do not overcome alienation are also miserable with their sexuality.

III.4.3 Cartoon of a sexually alienated man

Recently divorced from his third wife, Henry, fifty one, is a gourmet and an effective editor who draws out the best in writers. He has been well liked – even by his former spouses. Henry is open to all types of sexual satisfactions. He is an avid fan of the raunchy pornographer: Nicholson Baker. Henry prudently controls sexual impulses which would have undesirable social consequences. Henry, though, delights in whatever sexual activity he can “get away with” and according to his judgment “hurts no one.” However, he intensely dislikes homosexual physical relations; especially anal intercourse which he experienced as either painful or disgusting. His gay and bi-sexual friends pardon his homophobia because he has tried but found himself unfortunately incapable of enjoying the full range of sexuality. He has recently finished paying the college costs for his only child – a daughter from his second marriage. He is convinced, by the testimony of those involved, that the two abortions he funded were solutions providing the greatest happiness for those concerned. In his interior monologues he is comically dualistic thinking of himself wearing his business suit and his sexual suit. On the occasions when he has to inhibit himself he thinks “Well, little horndog, you could only sniff at that one” where “little horndog” is his term of endearment for his sexual self. Henry’s little horndog is like a pet whose

antics delight him although some of them could get Henry into plenty of trouble. Henry has a pet satyr or demon. But like any pet the little horndog himself is not subject to moral evaluation; only moral control exercised by Henry wearing his business suit.

However, the little horndog is not an ordinary pet. When Henry takes off his business suit Henry is the little horndog. If Henry is the little horndog sometime, why not all of the time? If the little horndog's life is as meaningless as that of other pets, what about Henry's? On the whole, Henry is a happy man and makes those around him happy. This is, in part, because he prudently thinks further ahead about his investments than he does about his fate as a human being. However, he may have philosophical moments when he does try to "put himself together." Then he will take a stance on sexuality.

His stance will be progressivism. Henry is my cartoon of a sexual progressive.

III.4.4 Progressivism requires sexual alienation

The distinguishing feature of sexual progressivism is the moral neutrality of sexuality. The moral rules, if any, for control of sexuality are based on other considerations such as justice, fairness or utility. A parody of Kantian reasoning reveals how progressivism requires alienation of a person's sexual self from that person's moral self. In my fifth chapter, I explain why I class this pattern of reasoning as Kantian

Henry's most recent affair with thirty-one-year-old Alice ended with uncharacteristic hostility. Alice deeply wounded Henry by harsh accusations of his sexual socio-pathology. Henry broods whether or not his sexuality has been as it ought to have been. He concedes that he has not been perfect but tells himself that in all honesty he has been a fairly decent man sexually. He has always been fair and considerate of the feelings of others while more-or-less following the sexual customs of his social class.

Let's articulate words for Henry's brooding about whether or not his sexuality has been as it ought to be. Implicitly he thinks that his maxim or personal policy has been: The right way for my sexuality to be is not to have any right way for it to be; I leave it open to be enjoyed in any way under the restrictions of justice, fairness and consideration for the feeling of others. Rising to explicit consciousness the logical oddness of "The right way for sexuality to be is to have no right way to be" forces Henry to clarify his broodings along lines such as the following. I am not really reflecting on the right way for my sexuality to be. I am thinking about the right way for me to be and my sexuality is not me. My maxim is better expressed as: The right way for me to be with respect to sexuality is to regard sexuality as morally plastic to be controlled by morals laws not specifically made for sexuality. So to have a maxim for his progressive sexuality which can be consistently generalized, the progressive Henry locates his sexual selves outside his moral self.

III.5 Demonic or animal?

When we succumb to the temptation to speak of evolution as a force, there is a temptation to think of human sexuality as a demonic force at the service of selfish genes pushing towards replication of human DNA. But such talk of evolution is anthropomorphic. To avoid anthropomorphism and use of a denigrating term, why not regard sexuality as our animal way of being?

Richard Dawkins's 1976 *The Selfish Gene*⁷ influenced my using the term "demonic" to describe an attitude towards sexuality. (Genes striving for replication seem to be little demons.) Dawkins correctly points out that his use of "selfish" is metaphorical. Use of the mathematics for game theory and decision theory, in which the objects of the domain are selfish agents, does not imply that all domains to which the mathematics is applied need contain objects with minds; let

alone selfish intentions. In principle, all goal seeking talk could be replaced with talk of functions. However, without the selfish metaphor Dawkins' book would be almost unreadable. With the metaphor it is a fascinating "read" after the fashion of good horror stories. But, what about sexuality as animalistic?

III.5.1 Animal = morally neutral

What is the significance of thinking of sexuality as animal? One way of interpreting our sexuality as animal assumes an answer contrary to a central thesis of this book. This central thesis is that our sexuality is inseparable from our humanity and just as our humanity has a right way to be so does our sexuality. Contrary to this thesis, calling sexuality animal amounts to saying that we do not attribute the making of normative judgments to our sexuality nor judge it morally. Sexuality is as morally neutral as our pulmonary functions or waste elimination operations. To be sure we can have rules for their use. For instance, think of the various rules for covering a sneeze. But by themselves they have no morally right ways to be.

III.5.2 Moral neutrality, sexual alienation and nihilism

Unless we are moral nihilists, it morally matters what we are and what we become by what we do. If by itself there is no sexual act or way of being sexual which is right or wrong, then by itself what we do and become sexually does not matter morally. So, if our sexuality is morally indifferent, then, it is not part of what we are and what we are to become by what we do. What we are and are to become is our being human in the morally proper way. Our being human is our humanity. Separating our sexuality from our humanity is what I mean by "sexual alienation."

Those who accept that there is no morally right way to be a human being are already moral nihilists. I am confronting those who are not explicitly moral nihilists. So, it is worth

emphasizing that taking sexuality as morally neutral does not imply having no sexual morality. It implies that the rules of sexual morality have some source external to sexuality such as laws of reasons or commands of a superior being.

III.5.3 Case against interpreting our sexuality as animal

Beyond being question-begging, classing sexuality as animal has the misleading connotation of degrading our sexuality as bestial. The classification gives little information. To be sure it does not have the bestial connotation for those who appreciate non-human animals. We gain no insight into psychological operation of human sexuality by labeling it "animal." What species of animal are we considering? We understand, rather dimly, the psychology of animal sexuality by setting up analogies between our external behavior and theirs and then attributing something like our inner states, feelings and thoughts, to them. Since we have no experience of inner states of non-human animals we cannot understand our inclinations, drives etc., by analogy to theirs. If we insist on talking of our sexuality as animal, we tend to push ourselves to a dualistic view of ourselves as animals plus something more. We take our traditional definition as rational animals to tell ourselves that we are some kind of animal with the non-animal feature of rationality. On this view moral laws come from reason for controlling our animal features which by themselves are morally lawless.

So, I deliberately do not use the simple label 'animal' for human sexuality. Human sexuality is the sexuality of a species of animal, viz., *homo sapiens*. Similarly, human rationality is the intelligence of a species of animal. In my argument for the Paternal Principle I do not want to assume that humans are a species of animal with some non-animal features. Indeed, I will show that my case against progressivism is stronger by assuming that human intelligence and

sexuality are founded in the human animal central nervous system as is the intelligence and sexuality of other mammals in their various nervous systems.

To repeat: Our sexuality is not part of our animal nature. Our sexuality is the sexuality of the human animal. It is a component of humanity. Similarly, our rationality is the rationality of the human animal.

I still use the term “demonization” for emphasis. Ultimately, though, “sexual alienation” is my preferred term for regarding our sexuality as morally indifferent. Alienation covers both trivialization and demonization.

III.6 Transition to a “philosophy of mind”

I now turn to making a case for crucial theses. Both rationality and sexuality are in nature. Sexuality is part of rationality. Rationality includes rules for its correct use. These theses support other crucial positions. Rules for rationality come from the nature of rationality. Sexuality includes rules of rationality for its correct use. The rules for sexuality come from the nature of sexuality. Holding that sexuality has no morally right way to be is to assert that a significant component of what we are is not part of what we are. The case is complex and there is repetition because I use a variety of considerations to support the same thesis.

III.6.1 Mind-body dualism indirectly criticized

Dualistic models of the human person are close to being common sense. In these models the mind or soul, which is separable from the body, is what the person really is. Our real place is not within a body. Great philosophers including Plato and Descartes along with all the issues generating mind-body problems suggest such models. (Gilbert Ryle’s polemic in his 1949 *The Concept of Mind*⁸ against dualism as positing a ghost in the machine still has influence on my thinking.) A subsidiary goal in my effort to found sexual morality in sexuality is to work towards

a non-dualistic “solution” to mind/body problems. Recognizing the dark side of sexuality further encourages dualism. The dark side of sexuality tempts us to alienate the sexual, and body in general, from what it is to be human.

Broadly speaking, there are two types of mind-body dualisms: Metaphysical and Moral. Descartes made precise the metaphysical dualism in which the mental is entirely non-spatial while the physical is entirely spatial. Metaphysical dualism leads to the currently insoluble philosophical problem of how there can be any interaction of the mental and the physical. Moral dualisms are less precise than Cartesian metaphysical dualism. In moral dualisms the physical part of a person is roughly identified with feelings, inclinations, passions, emotions, moods, etc. Metaphysical dualisms class feelings etc., with the mental. For moral dualism, the mental, or activities of the soul, are reasoning apart from any feelings. A major problem for moral dualism is how the soul can control feelings since its reasoning lacks any of the motivating power of feelings.

III.6.2 Conjectures on mind-body interaction problem

A book on sexual morality cannot be an examination of mind-body problems. Let me add, though, that foundations of the moral theory used here may contribute to dissolving the mind-body interaction problem. Here is how. Develop a model of how moral dualists properly identified affections (feelings) with the physical. (This is the hard part.) Show how moral dualists improperly separated cognitions (thoughts) from affections. Contemporary philosophical study of emotions⁹ provides principles and inspiration for blurring, if not eliminating, the distinction. This encourages me to ignore precise distinctions between thoughts and feelings. If my ignoring distinctions is coherent, I provide support for not making the distinctions.

Despite my religious beliefs, I do not advocate any dualism. My goal is to provide a secular case for a sexual morality by showing that a stance on what it is to be a human being which supports this sexual morality is an effective antidote to nihilism. Without a religious belief in some realm transcending the physical, dualism is nihilistic. The physical does not matter and with no proper place for our souls to go nothing matters. Indeed one of my criticisms of progressives is that their attempts to find a sexual morality in reasoning outside of sexuality tends towards dualism.

On another occasion I must reconcile my religious beliefs with my dismissal of dualism. I hope a reconciliation is possible. The meager and skeptical metaphysics I use, does not preclude extension to a metaphysics which supports faith in resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. In this life, though, I do not need the extension to make my case for the Paternal Principle.

III.7 Terminology, intelligence, rationality etc.,

I do not specify what reason, humanity, intelligence, rationality etc., are. I have no definition of these features and abilities of the human animal. That does not prevent us from talking intelligently about them. I hope the preceding and following supports this claim that we can talk intelligently about reason without a definition. The next two sub sections are primarily philosophical reasons in support of my not trying for definitions. The third one on humanity etc., focuses on the crucial terms.

III.7.1 Reason not private

At the outset, I emphasize that I am not writing of reason as some special power each of us has independently of other people's reason. I have been influenced by Richard Rorty's mockery of the view that reason is some special "mirror" each of has for representing things as they really are¹⁰. Reason is not similar to our capacity to breathe which we can exercise

regardless of whether or not anyone else does so. Our reason or mind can not be located within our bodies with some organ such as breathing with our lungs. Our mind is not simply our brain or central nervous system. Reason, mind, thinking and even feeling all require other people. We need language and culture to think. Of course, our central nervous system is necessary for any of us to think.

III.7.2 Skeptical Conceptualism

A review of the conceptualist position on general terms discussed in the previous chapter illustrates the public character of reason. Individual minds, on my view, do not have direct access to things in themselves in order to verify that they have correctly characterized some feature we experience. Later I use pragmatic arguments that over a period of time individuals can become legitimately convinced that they have more-or-less used a proper conceptual scheme for characterizing things in themselves. I illustrate with the notion of humanity.

I am a conceptualist about universals. Distinguishable individuals x and y are each H , e.g., humanity, if a warranted judgment based solely on what is observable in x and y says that the H of x is the same as the H of y . In particular the judgment is not warranted on the basis of conditions or objects apart from the individuals x and y . Judgments of sameness are settled by human thinking and there are no standards beyond human thinking for settling these issues of sameness. So as Wittgenstein and Kripke¹¹ have reminded us there is a basis of a deep anxiety that such judgments are arbitrary conventions. Such anxiety is the “price” for being a conceptualist. This conceptualism is “nominalistic” by lacking identity conditions for there to be conceptual objects. In the Popperian world 3, as I accept it for this work, there are no objects. However, I am not a nominalist who denies the possibility of such objects. Indeed a way of interpreting my pragmatic arguments in my eleventh chapter is justifying opening oneself to

accept such objects. I justify opening oneself to discovering an objective humanity (rationality) with sexual morality within it.

III.7.3 On humanity etc.

Important terms I use are “humanity,” “rationality” and “human intelligence.” Since they are somewhat vague terms used to mark salient features of the human animal, I tend to use “rationality,” “human intelligence,” and even “humanity” as nearly synonymous. The terms, of course, are not synonymous. They call attention to different ways of summarizing features believed to distinguish the human animal. For me the term “human intelligence” emphasizes problem solving skills. Human intelligence itself poses problems for human intelligence. People make mistakes. Fortunately human intelligence has a capacity to reflect upon what it does with a view to correcting its mistakes. When I am focusing on the capability of human intelligence to formulate rules or norms for both correct acting and thinking, I shall frequently write of human intelligence with the more honorific term “rationality” because self criticism is so important in guiding life by rules. *Rationality* is human intelligence subject to self criticism by human intelligence. When I use “*reasoning*” I mean uses of rationality. As I use “rationality” rationality can give incorrect results and, occasionally, be quite stupid. Uses of reason are uses of rationality. So reasoning can be incorrect and stupid. Nevertheless rationality and reasoning is all that we have for being correct and avoiding stupidity.

There is an evaluative use of “rationality” and cognate terms which stand for correct reasoning or, at least, the best available reasoning. Usually when I use “rationality” evaluatively the context will make it clear that I am not using it merely descriptively. If I fear that there might be confusion, I will specify how I am using “rationality.”

There is a use of “rationality” which I call the heuristic use. Under this usage we are thinking rationally when we try to divorce ourselves from all concerns except thinking correctly. This heuristic, and honorific, use of “rationality” is sometime labeled “objectivity.” It is heuristic because it is how we urge ourselves to think for scientific objectivity as well as moral objectivity. In general, this is good advice. Nonetheless, in a dull mind, objective thinking may be less than impressive.

There are two messages in the next two sections. One is to remind us that despite being prone to error and stupidity reliance on reason is not stupid. Reason has within it capacity to correct its errors – there is an ethics of belief within reasoning. The other is to suggest accepting our actual rationality as a model for accepting our sexuality. Recognition of our frequent sloppy thinking tempts us to alienate our actual thinking from some highly idealized rigorous thought which is what human rationality really is. Overcoming alienation of our reasoning is accepting (the obvious) that we can get help from nothing but our actual thinking which, not so obviously, with its norms correctly guides us to do better.

III.7.4 Actual Rationality, ideal rationality

Despite errors and stupidity, the evolutionary success of the human species so far indicates that reason is, on the whole, useful for continuation of the species up to the present. Of more significance for my case is the on-going effort of human reasoning to improve human reasoning. Even if articulation of rules of logic and critical thinking are not cultural universals, the fact these efforts are made in some cultures show that reason has the feature of trying to improve itself with the goal of getting right solutions for practical problems and the problem of finding out what is the case. However, logic and critical thinking are part of reasoning and also subject to error and folly.

III.7.5 Tversky and Kahnman vs. ideal rationality

Tversky and Kahnman¹² have show that much effective practical reasoning is not entirely rational by standards of critical thinking. Their research points out how people use biases and hunches to get successful results. These procedures are far from the standards of those of us who have specialized in critical thinking. If critical thinkers would have had control of things “at the beginning” the human species would have died out long ago. We must concede that human rationality is not entirely rational by standards of critical thinking. We break off critical thinking sooner or later and use biases and hunches to distinguish sense from nonsense. Knowing when to dispense with critical thinking is a dimension of being smart. Research such as Tversky and Kahnman remind us that in our efforts to have our rationality be ideally rational we have more work to do. In both individuals and in our species, rationality is rarely, if ever, what we think it ought to be. For us, then, reason in general has a goal of being as it ought to be even if it difficult to articulate this way and reasoning never tells us that we have reached the goal.

III.8 Humanity as embodied rationality

Humanity is what makes the human animal human. We are rational animals and humanity is human rationality as it occurs in the human individuals. In individuals rationality is inseparable from the tissues, physiological processes and psychological states which themselves are inseparable from physiological processes. With rationality regarded as our humanity, it is misleading to consider rationality existing, abstracted from other ways of thinking, as some mental deliberative or calculating faculty. An example of regarding rationality as somehow existing apart from our passionate or instinctive ways of thinking is Pinker’s view, in the previous chapter, of moral instinctive thinking interfering with genuine moral reasoning. Correlating a type of reasoning with a physiologically distinctive human brain region while correlating feeling

with its “low cunning” with a brain region with analogs in reptiles may simply reflect an alienation of human thinking from animal thinking. Of course, it is legitimate to focus on the deliberative and calculating aspects of human reasoning for some purposes such as logical critique.

III.8.1 Sexuality & intelligence as natural forces

Biological sexuality can be compared and contrasted with human intelligence without assuming that they are totally separable. Similarly our reproductive and circulatory systems may be compared and contrasted without assuming that they are totally separable. Intelligent processes as well as sexual processes are correlated with, if not identical with, neurobiological processes. Let us concede that both human sexuality and human intelligence are natural features of *homo sapiens* with evolutionary histories. The goals we set for ourselves and the principles in accordance with which we pursue them change the face of the earth. Currently human technology is being blamed for a significant role in climate change. Human fecundity also gets blamed for its indirect contribution to global warming as well as many other impacts on the environment. There is no denying, then, that humanity, as human intelligence, as well as human sexuality are significant natural forces which have evolved in nature.

III.8.2 Human sexuality as a use of human rationality

I have conceded that human beings are a result of evolutionary processes. I have not conceded that creation is nothing but a result of purposeless creative processes such as evolution. One corollary of my concession is that human rationality is a result of evolutionary processes. There are now on the face of the earth billions of individual humans using intelligence. The use of this intelligence in human sexuality is a result of evolutionary processes. Human sexuality is as natural to humans as is human rationality. In particular, using intelligence to restrict our

sexual behavior with rules is as natural as seeking sexual satisfaction. In rationality, though, the rules for its proper use are said to come from rationality itself – from part of nature. If rationality is regarded as inseparable from thinking about other areas of human concern, the rules for proper use of sexuality can be regarded as coming from human sexuality itself.

Accepting human sexuality as inseparable from our rationality overcomes sexual alienation. This recognition of rationality in sexuality enables us to recognize moral laws for sexuality coming from our sexuality. Just as reason tells us how our reason ought to be our sexuality, with reason in it, tells us how it ought to be. Can sexual urges and passions really lie within rationality?

III.8.3 Immersing reason in sexuality

Our inclinations, or appetites, are in fact intimately connected with our reasoning capacity or intelligence. I conjecture that any evolutionary history of reasoning would find reasoning inevitably connected with satisfying inclinations. It requires much abstraction to separate sexuality from conscious sexual goals, maxims for satisfying those goals, choice of means for actually getting the goals and self criticism of the rules used for getting those goals. In actual life, as opposed to its physiological representation, sexuality seems to be inseparable from reasoning. One could talk of “sexual reasoning.” There is goal setting and choices of technique for courting, bonding and even mating. Some may be innate although many are learned. Sexual reasoning is basically a type of practical reasoning subject to self criticism. However, reasoning is done by the whole person. So, any so-called sexual reasoning is use of human intelligence subject to whatever evaluation human intelligence is subject.

III.8.4 “Irrationality” of reason immersed in biology

Nonetheless, I agree with what we read earlier from Helen Epstein: “If sex were an entirely rational process, the species would probably have died out long ago.” The phrase “not entirely rational” can simply mean that the self critical capacity of human intelligence was never or rarely used to monitor instinctive behavior or goals and plans set by human intelligence. Such behavior is appropriately called reckless, impulsive. So, I read Epstein as reminding us that if sex were not frequently reckless, impulsive etc., the species would probably have died out long ago. She is probably right. To put it mildly: Much reflection on sexuality might have a rather chilling effect. However, to be inseparable from our human intelligence, sexuality does not have to be an entirely rational process. Intelligence is certainly not entirely rational in the honorific sense of being always correct. Neither is intelligence entirely rational by operating independently of passions and inclinations.

III.9 Fighting Hume on relation of reasons and passions

In the closing sections of this chapter, I am struggling to provide a model for the relation between reason and our passions or inclinations contrary to that in a model well expressed by David Hume in his 1739 *Treatise on Human Nature*.¹³

The following may oversimplify what I accept: No thinking without passion; no passion without thinking.

In Section III of Bk II, “On the Passions,” of his *Treatise*, David Hume wrote: “I shall endeavor to prove *first*, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and *secondly* that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will.”

He endeavors to prove these points to refute the commonly held belief that development of good moral character requires people to use their reason to control their passions. I will argue against Hume for the commonly held belief. The strategy of my argument is to make

intellectually attractive, a model in which the passions and reason are unified. So controlling our passions with reason is control of passions with our passions. For normative thinking is part of having passions. In particular, controlling our sexuality with our reason is controlling our sexuality with the moral reasoning of our sexual passions.

III.9.1 Humanity as what we are and ought to be

My claims about humanity present an assumed view of the human person. They are obviously not reports of “what we all accept.” Humanity is the reasoning and capacity for reasoning of the human animal as it occurs in actual human beings. Since humanity is in actual individuals, it is not separable from the psychological states of the individuals. Humanity is not some battery of intellectual features imposed upon non-cognitive features such as inclinations, desires, etc. On this view, the passions and reason of a person are connected in the humanity of a person. They work inseparably together. On this view of the reason of a person, one would disagree with Hume’s claim that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions.¹⁴ It would be odd to claim that humanity is and ought to be the slave of the passions. Such a claim would say that humanity is and ought to be a slave to itself. Rather: Humanity serves itself for itself. Why: Because it ought to do so. How: By being as it ought to be. This moral humanism is elaborated throughout this book.

III.9.2 Humanity as an end-in-itself

Reasoning and the capacity for reasoning, viz., human intelligence, do not exist apart from individual human beings. What is done by humanity is done by individuals or collections of individuals. What is done for humanity is done for individual human beings either by doing something for an individual or collection of individuals or acting and thinking with a collection. Under an assumption that reason has a way it ought to be, humanity has a way it ought to be. So

individuals and their communities have a way they ought to be. (In this work on individual morality, I set aside the elaboration needed to rebut an accusation of a composition fallacy by talking of communal obligations.) The obligations of being human are sometimes burdensome. Why, then, ought we be as humans ought to be? We are, by assumption, beings who have a way we ought to be. If we are going to be at all, there is no alternative to being human. So we have no alternative to these obligations. This answer does not offer any incentive for fulfilling these obligations. So, if we are to be at all, being human is not something we are for the sake of getting something else. Since humanity has a way it ought to be, the way humanity ought to be is an end which ought to be pursued for its own sake. Humanity is an end-in-itself.

III.9.3 Humean model of reason being “enslaved by reason”

As noted above, I am struggling to set aside a model of humanity on which a conclusion that reasoning is insufficient to guide conduct characterizes a structural feature of the model. The temptation comes from a theory, or model, that to act we need a psychological motive force to start us acting towards a goal, even a goal which careful cost-benefit thinking shows us will get us more of what we want than any other course of conduct. The model of action says that we need to want that which we are supposed to get and reason does not show us what to want. At least for fundamental wants, reason does not tell us what to want. I do not want to argue about psychological models. However, it is not far fetched to speculate that as the ability to choose means evolved a desire for some ends also evolved. These co-evolving ends could be called ends of reason. For instance, an inclination for plans to work out successfully could have co-evolved with our practical reasoning. In the next section, I shall try to show how the passions can be “enslaved by reason” to pursue its ends. However, we can grant that as long as the model for practical reasoning is cost-benefit reasoning, a very good model for rational thinking is to

assume that some basic wants are given by inclinations and then we use reasoning to satisfy them. In light of this model it is trivial to hold that practical reasoning serves the passions.

III.9.4 Reason mastering the passions

I write of reason controlling the passions or inclinations. However, as I announced earlier I prefer not to use language in ways suggesting a sharp distinction between reasoning and feeling. In this example, I do not sharply distinguish reasoning and feeling. So, I do not give an example of acting from a sense of duty alone where this sense is to be devoid of any pro-attitude towards doing what is right. But I hope it suffices to show that Hume's claim is misleading about the roles of reasoning and feeling.

The gist of the following critique of Hume is to accept that causation between thoughts, feelings and actions is Humean.¹⁵ If choices or acts are regularly preceded by certain thoughts and feelings, those thought and feelings can be accepted as the cause of the choice or act.

Causation is only well establish correlation.

III.9.5 Reason mastering a passion for masturbation

Let's re-visit Carl the happy masturbating widower. He is still at it, although not quite so happy. After a couple of years he still has incredible porn-provoked sexual fantasies and despite his sixty-three years intense orgasms. Carl is not quite so happy anymore about going on this way the rest of his life even if he should die before his "sexuality dies out." Carl calculates that all things considered the benefits less costs of continuing outweigh the benefits less costs of the alternative which nags him. The alternative which nags him is the Paternal Principle demanding that he go "cold turkey on jacking-off."

No alternatives involving masturbation would change the character of his sexual life. Besides they would not be cost effective. He could not do more. He is "maxed-out" on sexual

satisfaction; after all he is now sixty-three. Anything less, such as masturbating only on even numbered days, would diminish the benefits without adding anything other than frustration on odd numbered days. He estimates very high costs for pursuing women. Even then the Paternal Principle and perhaps some women, would nag him unless he married. Carl allocates very high costs to marriage since his marriage had not been great. Nonetheless Carl thinks of his sexual practice as making his whole life insignificant. He is just “putting in his time” getting the most satisfaction he can as “dirty old man.” He asks himself what he would get by trying to follow the Paternal Principle. He vividly imagines what he would lose. Trying to follow the principle would give him moments of the pleasure of feeling self-righteous. But these rare moral pleasures are as fleeting as orgasms and certainly not as intense. A sense of a significant life also comes and goes. However, Carl thinks that by choosing to try to follow the principle he would be trying to act as he ought and be the kind of man he ought to be.

One day, because he thinks this way Carl chooses to follow the principle.

What I just wrote is coherent and describes a physical possibility just as does writing of Carl: He chose to continue masturbating because he thought that the benefits of doing so outweighed the costs.

Of course, once Carl chooses to act and be as he ought, the struggle begins. In this struggle he has to think how he can organize his thoughts and feelings to bring him into conformity with how he ought to act and be. It would be inaccurate to say that Carl’s reasoning is a slave of his passions. Carl, who has feeling-infused reasoning, is trying to master himself.

III.9.6 Aside on rationality, simplicity and happiness

Let us grant “No *entirely* rational process is necessary for the evolutionary success of humans.” We certainly cannot infer from that proposition “No rational process is necessary for

the evolutionary success of humans.” It is quite possible that once animals evolved to a certain stage cognitive processes had been selected over heavily, if not entirely, instinctive processes. At that stage rational processes might have become necessary for the continual survival and development into humans. There is no reason for thinking that elimination of rational processing in our activities will get us any closer to evolutionary success let alone closer to a natural way of acting for our species. I will not debate any claim about rational processes being either necessary or sufficient for human happiness. As far as I can understand happiness, human happiness is evolutionarily irrelevant.

III.9.7 Hume’s overcoming sexual alienation by “demonizing” reason

Above I noted that I am working to replace Hume’s model of the relation between reason and the passions. In this chapter, I am also criticizing sexual alienation which separates reason from the passions but regards the passions as somehow outside our reason and outside even our humanity. On Hume’s model reason is not alienated from the passions. The passions “own” reason. The Humean proposal recommends interpreting all reasoning as ways of satisfying inclinations. As Hume put it: Reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions. (Hume’s use of “ought” here marks his famous claim as a proposal.) I suggest that the reasoning involved with a passion is and ought to serve the passion while guiding it to its proper satisfactions.

On Hume’s proposal, and mine, we recognize no split in reasoning. Any reasoning is a response to satisfy inclinations. I reject Hume’s proposal as ultimately nihilistic. The nihilism is revealed in another famous, or infamous, Hume remark about no goal really being contrary to reason¹⁶.

“Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole to the scratching of my finger. Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of

an Indian or a person totally unknown to me. 'Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledged lesser good to my greater, “

Hume's *Treatise* Bk. II, Part III, Section III

Hume's nihilism is of the “everything is permitted” variety. The basic determiners of human life are passions or inclinations. In my thinking I use the Kantian term “inclination” (*Neigung*) rather than Hume's term “passion.” If no basic determiners are contrary to reason, then no basic determiners are forbidden. If no basic determiners are forbidden, then everything is permissible by reason. For Hume it turns out that in fact we do not permit everything because we have sentiments which lead us to condemn destructive behavior. But it is only a brute fact that we do not permit everything

III.10 Transition to main argument for the Paternal Principle

Enough has been presented about problems with sexuality, sexual alienation and the controversies about the place of reason in sexuality, to lay out my case in the next chapter for the Paternal Principle. One of many lessons we can take away from this chapter is suspicion. If there is a sexual practice which gives us concern, e.g. a double standard for sexual activity for young men vs. young women, and we try to set aside that concern by interpreting that conduct as due to forces too powerful to control, be suspicious of our rationalizations.

¹ E. J. James, Vantage Books, New York 2011

² June 9, 2011,.

³ *The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo*, by Stieg Larrson, Translated by Reg Keeland, 465 pp. Alfred A. Knopf., New York, 2005.

⁴ “God and the Fight Against AIDS,” *New York Review of Books* Volume 52, Number 7 · April 28, 2005, Helen Epstein is a visiting scholar at the Center for Health and Well being at Princeton. Her book on AIDs research is *Invisible Cure: Africa, the West, and the Fight Against AIDS*, Farrar, Strauss & Giroux., New York, 2007.

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Oxford U. Press,

⁸ Barnes & Noble, New York

⁹ See Ronald deSousa's excellent article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: de Sousa, Ronald, "Emotion", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition)*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/emotion/>>.

¹⁰ *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

¹¹ *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, Harvard U Press, 1982

¹² For an early work see: Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky (1979) "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk", *Econometrica*, XLVII (1979), 263-291.

¹³ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Selby-Bigge edition Oxford, 1888, Bk I On the Understanding, Bk II On the Passions, Bk III Of Morals

¹⁴ Hume's *Treatise*_Bk II, Part III, Section III

¹⁵ Hume's *Treatise* Bk I, Part III, Section XV

¹⁶ Hume's *Treatise* Bk. II, Part III, Section III.